

### Putting the Theory to Work: Procrastination

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#### Procrastination

- ▶ In many economic problems, agent must do a task
  - ▶ Task needs to be done exactly once
  - ▶ Agent Has several time periods to do task
- ▶ To analyze these types of decisions, use *backwards induction*: start analysis at the end of the process and work back to the first period
  - ▶ *Naïve* agent is time inconsistent, but assumes self will be time-consistent in future
  - ▶ *Sophisticated* agent is time inconsistent, and knows self will be time-inconsistent in future

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#### Procrastination Example: Setup

- ▶ Suppose student has a paper due in 4 weeks
- ▶ Can write the paper on weekend 1, 2, 3, or 4
- ▶ Cost of writing paper is missing going to movies with friends:
  - ▶ Weekend 1: bad movie, cost = 3
  - ▶ Weekend 2: OK movie, cost = 5
  - ▶ Weekend 3: good movie, cost = 8
  - ▶ Weekend 4: great movie, cost = 13
- ▶ Benefit of writing the paper is  $\bar{v} > 0$ , received in week 5 when grades are given
- ▶ For all types of agents, assume  $\delta = 1$  in what follows
- ▶ For time-inconsistent types, assume  $\beta = \frac{1}{2}$

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## When Does Time-Consistent Agent Write Paper?

- ▶ Proceed by *backwards induction*: start analysis at the end of the process and work back to the first period
- ▶ Week 4:
- ▶ Week 3:
- ▶ Week 2:
- ▶ Week 1:

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## Decision Tree

- ▶ Can be helpful to keep track of decisions of agent with a decision tree:

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## When Does Sophisticated Time-Inconsistent Agent Write Paper?

- ▶ *Sophisticated* agent is time inconsistent, and knows will be time-inconsistent in future
- ▶ Week 4:
- ▶ Week 3:
- ▶ Week 2:

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## Sophisticated Time-Inconsistent Agent, con't

- ▶ Week 1:
- ▶ Overall result:

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## Decision Tree for Sophisticated Agent

## When Does Naive Time-Inconsistent Agent Write Paper?

- ▶ *Naive* agent is time inconsistent, but incorrectly assumes will they be time-consistent in future
- ▶ Week 4:
- ▶ Week 3:
- ▶ Week 2:

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## Naive Time-Inconsistent Agent, con't

## Decision Tree for Naive Agent

- ▶ Week 1:
- ▶ Overall result:

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## The Marshmallow Test: Mischel et al (1989)

### Measuring Time Preferences

- ▶ 35 preschoolers in lab, each given one marshmallow
- ▶ Told that if they can wait 15 minutes without eating marshmallow, they can get another one
- ▶ Measure how long they wait before eating marshmallow
- ▶ 12 years later, those students take the SAT
- ▶ Results:
  - ▶ Waiting time strongly positively correlated with SAT math and verbal scores
  - ▶ Waiting for 5 more minutes predict 40 points higher SAT math score

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### Measuring Time Preferences

- ▶ So far, evidence we have seen has not attempted to estimate either aggregate or individual time preference parameters (eg  $\beta$  or  $\delta$ )
- ▶ General strategy in economics experiments
  - ▶ Focus on tradeoffs two time periods, say  $t$  and  $t + k$
  - ▶ Try to find point where  $u(c_t) = \beta^{1-\gamma} \delta^k u(c_{t+k})$
  - ▶ By varying  $t$ , allows us to estimate  $\beta$  and  $\delta$  separately
- ▶ Several experimental methods to go about doing this
  - ▶ Willingness to pay: *State the lowest amount you'd be willing to accept today instead of \$X in one month*
  - ▶ Matching: *I am indifferent between \$... today and \$X in one month*
  - ▶ Multiple Price Lists: *Indicate which one you prefer: \$X today or \$Y in one month*

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### Details on Multiple Price List Methodology

- ▶ Most commonly used experimental method
- ▶ Choices between a smaller, sooner reward and a later, larger reward
- ▶ Typically one option stays fixed while the other varies
- ▶ Point at which subject switches from smaller/sooner reward to larger/later reward helps estimate their time preference parameters

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## Example Multiple Price List (MPL)

List 1		
Choice	Option A	Option B
1	\$100 today	\$99 in one month
2	\$100 today	\$101 in one month
3	\$100 today	\$103 in one month

List 2		
Choice	Option A	Option B
1	\$100 in one month	\$99 in two months
2	\$100 in one month	\$101 in two months
3	\$100 in one month	\$103 in two months

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## Measuring $\beta - \delta$ Preferences with MPL

- ▶ Assume for simplicity that  $u(x) = x$
- ▶ Suppose you say that you are indifferent between \$100 in one month and \$Y in two months
- ▶ Then we must have  $\beta\delta 100 = \beta\delta^2 Y$ , which implies:
- ▶ Suppose additionally you are indifferent between \$100 today and \$X in one month
- ▶ Then we must have  $100 = \beta\delta X$
- ▶ Together with the equation for  $\delta$  above, this implies:


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## Field Evidence: Meier and Sprenger (2010)

- ▶ Give MPLs to people coming in for tax advice in Boston
- ▶ Did same procedure on same population in two different years: 2007 and 2008
- ▶ 1500 observations, including 200 people who showed up both years
- ▶ Because of setting, had access to income data
- ▶ Results:
  - ▶ Estimates of  $\beta$  between 0.672 and 0.792
  - ▶ Estimates of monthly  $\delta$  between 0.953 and 0.981
  - ▶ Estimates remarkably stable between years

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## Meier and Sprenger (2010): Graphical Results



- ▶  $t$  is early period,  $\tau$  is delay length
- ▶ Note that when early reward is immediate, more likely to take early payment

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## Inconsistent Estimates in the Whole

- ▶ Frederick et al. (2002): Review of time preference literature
- ▶ Large variation in estimates of  $\beta$  from the literature as a whole




Figure 2. Discount Factor by Year of Study Publication

## Potential Problems with the Standard MPL Approach

- ▶ Linearity assumption allows us to get simple formulas for parameters
  - ▶ If  $u(x)$  concave, then estimates are biased
- ▶ Have assumed that transaction costs are same in all time periods
- ▶ Note we are trading off money, so subjects with access to bank accounts should be able to arbitrage if implicit interest rate in experiment is different than actual interest rate