

Econ 301: Microeconomic Analysis

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Oligopoly

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Motivation

- ▶ Today we will apply game theory to markets in particular
- ▶ Ideal tool to study the case where we have multiple firms interacting (so not monopoly) but firms are big enough to influence market price (so not pure competition)
 - ▶ This is *oligopoly*
- ▶ Two simplifying assumptions
 - ▶ Just two firms (*duopoly*)
 - ▶ Firms are producing identical products (no *product differentiation*)

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Overview

- ▶ Two possible timings of firm choices
 - ▶ Sequential: use backwards induction
 - ▶ Simultaneous: use Nash equilibrium
- ▶ Two possible choice variables for firms:
 - ▶ Price
 - ▶ Quantity
- ▶ Thus there are four possible models:
 1. Sequential quantity competition (Stackleberg)
 2. Sequential price competition (won't cover this)
 3. Simultaneous quantity competition (Cournot)
 4. Simultaneous price competition (Bertrand)

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Sequential Quantity Competition: Setup

- ▶ Firm 1 chooses quantity y_1 first (the *quantity leader* or *first mover*)
- ▶ Then firm 2 (the *follower* or *second mover*) chooses its quantity y_2
- ▶ Total quantity $Y = y_1 + y_2$
- ▶ Inverse demand $p(Y) = p(y_1 + y_2)$
- ▶ Cost functions $c_1(y_1)$ and $c_2(y_2)$
- ▶ Also known as *Stackleberg model*

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Example: Linear Demand

- ▶ Suppose inverse demand is given by $p(Y) = a - bY = a - b(y_1 + y_2)$
- ▶ Assume both firms have zero marginal cost
- ▶ What are Stackleberg equilibrium quantities?

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Sequential Quantity Competition: Solution

- ▶ Which solution concept do we use?
- ▶ Follower (firm 2) solves
 - ▶ Gives us firm 2's *reaction function*: $y_2 = f_2(y_1)$
- ▶ Now consider firm 1's (leader's) problem:
 - ▶ Note that firm 2's reaction function is in firm 1's problem
 - ▶ Solving this problem gives leader's quantity
 - ▶ Plug in to find follower's quantity

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Simultaneous Quantity Competition

- ▶ Suppose firms both set quantity at same time
- ▶ What solution concept should we use now?
- ▶ Firm 1's problem:
 - ▶ Can be solved to give optimal y_1 as function of y_2 : $y_1 = f_1(y_2)$
 - ▶ This is reaction function, or best response function
- ▶ Similarly, can get firm 2's best response function: $y_2 = f_2(y_1)$

Definition

The Nash equilibrium of the Cournot model (known as Cournot equilibrium) is a quantity pair (y_1^*, y_2^*) such that

$$y_1^* = f_1(y_2^*)$$

$$y_2^* = f_2(y_1^*)$$

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Cournot Equilibrium: Example

- ▶ Firms face linear inverse demand $p = a - bY$, have zero marginal cost
- ▶ What are Cournot equilibrium quantities?

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Cournot Equilibrium Graphically

- ▶ Note that Cournot equilibrium occurs where reaction functions/best response function cross

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Simultaneous Price Setting

- ▶ Suppose instead firms simultaneously announce prices p_1 and p_2
- ▶ Both firms have constant marginal cost c
- ▶ Both firms have capacity to serve entire market
- ▶ Firm that announces lower price gets all of market share; if tie, they split market share
- ▶ What is the Nash equilibrium?

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