

Econ 301: Microeconomic Analysis

Prof. Jeffrey Naecker

Wesleyan University

Expected Utility

1 / 22

2 / 22

Motivating Example: Insurance

- ▶ Income is \$35,000
- ▶ With probability $p = .01$, lose \$10,000 to a house fire
- ▶ Can buy \$10,000 of insurance coverage for \$100
 - ▶ Then net income will be \$34,900 regardless of whether house fire happens or not
- ▶ Which option would you rather have?
 1. 99% chance of \$35,000 with 1% chance of \$25,000
 2. \$34,900 for sure
- ▶ Consumer will pick option with higher *expected utility*

3 / 22

Contingent Consumption

- ▶ Different *states of the world* with corresponding probabilities
- ▶ *Contingent consumption plan*: what consumption will be in each state of the world
- ▶ For insurance example:
 - ▶ Two states of the world: good (no fire) and bad (fire)
 - ▶ Bad state occurs with probability π
 - ▶ Income M received in either state
 - ▶ Loss L if bad state
 - ▶ Choice amount of insurance coverage K
 - ▶ Insurance premium γ : cost of getting \$1 of coverage
 - ▶ Contingent consumption plan:

4 / 22

Budget Constraint

- ▶ Think of consumption in state 1 as a good and consumption in state 2 as another good
- ▶ What is formula for budget constraint?

▶ What is slope?

▶ What point does budget line go through?

5 / 22

Budget Constraint Graphically

6 / 22

Expected Utility

- ▶ Consider a general contingent consumption plan

$$A = (\pi_i, c_i)_{i=1}^N = (\pi_1, c_1; \pi_2, c_2; \dots; \pi_N, c_N)$$

meaning

- ▶ consume c_1 in state 1, which occurs with probability π_1
- ▶ consume c_2 in state 2, which occurs with probability π_2
- ▶ and so on
- ▶ A is also called a *gamble*
- ▶ The *expected utility* of A is

$$EU(A) = \sum_i \pi_i u(c_i) = \pi_1 u(c_1) + \pi_2 u(c_2) + \dots + \pi_N u(c_N)$$

- ▶ Compare to the *expected value* of A :

$$EV(A) = \sum_i \pi_i c_i = \pi_1 c_1 + \pi_2 c_2 + \dots + \pi_N c_N$$

Why this formula?

7 / 22

What Shape Should $u(x)$ Have?

- ▶ Consider the following game: I will flip a coin until the first heads comes up. If the first heads is on flip number n , then I'll pay you $\$2^n$. How much would you pay to play this game?
 - ▶ Originally proposed by Bernoulli (1738, reprinted 1954)
- ▶ What is the expected payoff of this game?
- ▶ It is clear that there must be *diminishing marginal utility of money*
 - ▶ Intuition: an extra \$1000 is massive windfall for a very poor person but not even noticeable for very rich person
- ▶ We can rationalize the typically observed behavior by assuming that $u(x)$ is concave

8 / 22

Risk Aversion

- ▶ If $u(x)$ is concave, we say the underlying preferences are *risk averse*
 - ▶ Recall concavity of u means $u'' < 0$
- ▶ If risk averse, then $EU(A) < u(EV(A))$ because of concavity of $u(\cdot)$
 - ▶ In words: expected utility of a gamble is less than the utility of its expected value
- ▶ Useful tip for drawing EU: If gamble A pays off either x_1 or x_2 , then $EU(A)$ lies on the line connecting $u(x_1)$ and $u(x_2)$, directly above $EV(A)$

9 / 22

Risk Aversion Graphically

10 / 22

Certainty Equivalent and Risk Premium

- ▶ The *certainty equivalent* of a gamble A is the amount CE such that $u(CE) = EU(A)$
 - ▶ That is, certain amount that gives same utility as uncertain gamble
 - ▶ How does certainty equivalent relate to expected value of gamble?
- ▶ The *risk premium* is the amount $RP = EV(A) - CE$
 - ▶ That is, difference between expected value of gamble and certainty equivalent of gamble
 - ▶ What is sign of risk premium?

11 / 22

Risk Aversion vs Risk Seeking

- ▶ Can also have *risk-seeking* preferences (convex $u(x)$) where all of the above statements are reversed
- ▶ Can also have *risk-neutral* preferences (linear $u(x)$)

In summary:

Risk Averse	Risk Neutral	Risk Seeking
$u(x)$ concave	$u(x)$ linear	$u(x)$ convex
$EU(A) < u(EV(A))$	$EU(A) = u(EV(A))$	$EU(A) > u(EV(A))$
$CE < EV(A)$	$CE = EV(A)$	$CE > EV(A)$
$RP > 0$	$RP = 0$	$RP < 0$

12 / 22

Risk Aversion: Example

- ▶ Consider a coin flip for \$15 or \$5
- ▶ Let $u(x) = \sqrt{x}$
- ▶ Expected value:
- ▶ Utility of getting expected value for certain:
- ▶ Expected utility of gamble:
- ▶ Certainty equivalent of gamble:
- ▶ Risk premium of gamble:

13 / 22

Absolute Risk Aversion

- ▶ Suppose we want to compare risk aversion across people
- ▶ Naively, we may just compare the curvature $u''(x)$
- ▶ But this depends on the scale of utility
- ▶ Instead, use the coefficient of *absolute risk aversion*, $-\frac{u''(x)}{u'(x)}$
 - ▶ Also known as *Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion*
- ▶ For risk-averse individual, coefficient must be positive
- ▶ Person with higher coefficient is more risk averse

14 / 22

Interpreting Absolute Risk Aversion

- ▶ Coefficient may be constant, increasing, or decreasing as x increases
- ▶ Constant absolute risk aversion (CARA): as wealth increases, hold same number of dollars in risky asset
- ▶ Increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA): as wealth increases, hold fewer dollars in risky asset
- ▶ Decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA): as wealth increases, hold more dollars in risky asset

15 / 22

Relative Risk Aversion

- ▶ May want to scale by wealth/income x
- ▶ Use *coefficient of relative risk aversion*, $-x \frac{u''(x)}{u'(x)}$
- ▶ For risk-averse individual, coefficient must be positive (for positive x)
- ▶ Coefficient may be constant (CRRA), increasing (IRRA), or decreasing (DRRA) as x increases
 - ▶ Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA): as wealth increases, hold same percentage of dollars in safe asset
 - ▶ Increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA): as wealth increases, hold higher percentage of dollars in safe asset
 - ▶ Decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA): as wealth increases, hold lower percentage of dollars in safe asset

16 / 22

Examples

- ▶ Does utility function $u(x) = \ln(x)$ exhibit increasing, decreasing, or constant absolute risk aversion?
- ▶ Does utility function $u(x) = \sqrt{x}$ exhibit increasing, decreasing, or constant absolute risk aversion?
- ▶ Which one is more risk averse?

17 / 22

Returning to the Insurance Example

- ▶ What is expected profit for insurance company?
- ▶ What should γ equal in a competitive insurance market?

18 / 22

Consumer Behavior Under Fair Insurance

- ▶ What is expected utility of consumer as function of K ? (Assume they have utility function u)
- ▶ What is optimal insurance coverage K ?

19 / 22

Appendix

20 / 22

Why Is Expected Utility Reasonable?

- ▶ Suppose you make just a few innocuous assumptions about preferences between gambles:
 1. Completeness: For any gambles A and B , either $A \succeq B$ or $B \succeq A$ (or both).
 2. Transitivity: For any gambles A , B , and C , if $A \succeq B$ and $B \succeq C$, then $A \succeq C$.
 3. Continuity: For any gambles A , B , and C , if $A \succeq B \succeq C$ then there exists some number $p \in (0, 1]$ such that $pA + (1 - p)C \sim B$.
 4. Independence: For any gambles A , B , C such that $A \succeq B$ and any $p \in (0, 1]$, we must have $pA + (1 - p)C \succeq pB + (1 - p)C$.

Theorem (von Neuman and Morgenstern)

Preferences over gambles that satisfy conditions 1-4 can be represented by expected utility.

21 / 22

The Importance of Independence

- ▶ The independence axiom is the most important one for expected utility theory
- ▶ What is the intuition for this axiom?
 - ▶ How you feel about a prize (ie a specific amount of money) does not depend on the probability you receive it
- ▶ How does this manifest in EUT?
 - ▶ Let gamble A have three possible outcomes, i.e.
 $A = (\pi_1, x_1; \pi_2, x_2; \pi_3, x_3)$
 - ▶ Recall $EU(A) = \sum_i \pi_i u(x_i) = \pi_1 u(x_1) + \pi_2 u(x_2) + \pi_3 u(x_3)$
 - ▶ Note that utility is *additively separable* in probabilities
 - ▶ That is, $EU(\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_3, \cdot) = f_1(\pi_1) + f_2(\pi_2) + f_3(\pi_3)$
 - ▶ Note that utility is *linear* in probabilities
 - ▶ That is, $EU(\pi_i, \cdot) = a\pi_i + b$ for some constants a and b

Back

22 / 22